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CHAPTER 1 
THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN HEALTH BENEFIT DESIGN AMONG 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DIABETES IN LARGE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
INSURANCE PLANS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Prescription drugs expenditures, accounting for only 10% of total healthcare spending in 
2008 (compared to 31% for hospitals and 21% for physician services), are one of the fastest 
growing components of U.S. health care budget (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).  Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) project that growth in prescription drug spending is 
expected to accelerate through 2019, reaching 7.7 percent due to increases in drug prices, which 
are expected to account for about half of this growth.  The U.S. spends more than $246 billion on 
prescription drugs alone in 2009, six times the $40.3 billion spent in 1990, because of higher use 
of antiviral drugs, as well as faster price growth for brand-name prescription drugs (CMS, 
National Health Expenditure Projections 2009-2019; Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).  
According to statistics from the Kaiser Family Foundation, from 1998 to 2008, prescription 
drugs contributed 13% of the total growth in national health expenditures, compared to 30% for 
hospital care and 21% for physician and clinical services (Figure 1.1, Kaiser Family Foundation 
2010).  In addition, from 2000 to 2009 average copay for generic drugs and preferred drugs 
increased by 25% and 80%, respectively, for workers with employer-sponsored health plans 
(Figure 1.2, Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).  
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Figure 1.1: Average Annual Percentage Change in Selected National Health Expenditures,  
1996-2008 
 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation calculations using National Health Expenditure historical data 
from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/Prescription-Drug-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx 
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Figure 1.2:  Among Covered Workers with Three, Four, or More Tiers of Prescription Drug Cost 
Sharing, Average Copayments, 2000-2009 
 
*Estimate is statistically different from estimate for the previous year shown at p<.05. 
 
^Fourth-Tier drug copay information was not obtained prior to 2004; fourth-tier drugs have new 
types of cost-sharing arrangements that typically build additional layers of higher copayments or 
coninsurance for specifically identified types of drugs such as lifestyle drugs or biologics. 
 
Source: Kaiser/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits, 2000-2009, Exhibit 9.4, 
http://ehbs.kff.org/?page=charts&id=2&sn=24&ch=1139. 
 
With spending for prescription drugs rising so rapidly, employers and insurers are 
seeking different cost-cutting strategies to stem this tide.  These include cost-shifting, cost-
sharing or multi-tiered formularies, where consumer cost-sharing increases for products on 
higher tiers compared with lower tiers, use of value-based formularies, and working with local 
pharmacies.  In 2009, over three-quarters (78%) of workers with employer-sponsored coverage 
were in plans with 3 or 4 tiers of cost sharing for prescription drugs, almost three times the 
proportion in 2000 (27%) (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).  The implementations of such cost-
control mechanisms have helped slow the growth in outpatient prescription drug spending.  Since 
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2000, the double-digit rates of increase in prescription drug spending have declined each year 
except for 2006, which was the year Medicare Part D was implemented.  By 2008, the annual 
rate of increase in prescription drug spending was 3%, compared to 5% for hospital care and 5% 
for physician services (Figure 1.3, Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).  
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Total National Prescription Drug Expenditures by Type of Payer, 
1990-2008 
 
Notes:  Consumer Out-of-Pocket includes direct spending by consumers for health care goods 
and services not covered by a health plan and cost-sharing amounts (coinsurance, copayments, 
deductibles) required by public and private health plans.  It does not include consumer premium 
payments and cost sharing paid by supplementary Medicare policies, which are included in the 
Private Health Insurance category.  May not total 100% due to rounding. 
 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation calculations using National Health Expenditure historical data 
from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/. 
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Previous studies have shown that both insurance status and the level of insurance benefits 
affect the use of prescription drugs.  The RAND Health Insurance Experiment was one of the 
first studies to suggest that consumers are price-sensitive for these and other health goods (Lohr, 
Brook et al. 1986).  Subsequent studies have shown that the uninsured people have a smaller 
probability of essential medication1 use than the insured.  Moreover, among the insured, higher 
cost-sharing levels reduced less essential medication use more than more essential medication 
(necessary to maintain or improve health) use (Lohr, Brook et al. 1986; Goldman, Joyce et al. 
2004).  Contrary to much conventional wisdom, some of the most prevalent chronically ill 
populations—patients with hypertension, diabetes, or high cholesterol, to name a few—are fairly 
price-sensitive to medications for their conditions.  However, the mechanisms by which patients 
reduce their utilization are not well understood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Essential medication was defined as “necessary to maintain or improve health status” (Lohr, 1986; Goldman, 
2004). 
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1.2 Research Objective  
Prescription drugs have become an indispensable means to treat and manage chronic 
illnesses.  Thus, the issues of affordability and trade-offs between medications and other health 
care services are important for chronically ill patients, particularly for patients with diabetes who 
typically have more than one comorbidity that require drug therapy, and their insurance plans.   
These issues call for a fuller understanding of the dynamic structure of demand for prescription 
drugs and other health care services (inpatient and outpatient) via an analysis of cost-shifting 
approach (e.g. higher copays or coinsurance amount).  Many employers and insurers are 
increasingly using this approach to influence patient utilization of medications and drug 
spending, thus shifting medication costs from the insurers to the patients.  Previous research has 
shown that switching from a flat to a two-tier copayment benefit plan reduced mean drug 
spending in an employer-sponsored population by 6-19 percent, but with no significant increases 
in out-of-pocket costs (Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002).  Other studies that focused on three-tier drug 
plans show that increases in patients’ out-of-pocket costs lower health plan drug spending 
(Motheral and Fairman 2001).      
 In this dissertation, I analyze the effect of prescription drug cost-shifting via changes in 
drug benefit design on healthcare expenditure among individuals with diabetes.  I take into 
account the comorbid effect of diabetes for the age population ranging from 18 to 62, given that 
over three-fourth of individual with diabetes age 18 through 79 are diagnosed before age 64 and 
more than half are diagnosed between 40 and 59 (Figure 1.4, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) 2008).   
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Figure 1.4 Distribution of Age at Diagnosis of Diabetes Among Adult Incident Cases Aged 
 
18–79 Years, United States, 2008 
 
 
Source:  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Health 
Statistics, Division of Health Interview Statistics, data from the National Health Interview 
Survey. 
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1.3 Why Diabetes?  
The health and economic effects of diabetes are enormous.  Diabetes is one of the most 
common chronic conditions for which prescription medications exist.   From 1997 to 2007, the 
proportion of people with diabetes who reported using oral anti-diabetic medications more than 
doubled, from 5.9 million to 14.6 million (AHRQ 2010).  Given the aging of the population, 
changes in ethnic makeup, and the dramatic increase in obesity and sedentary lifestyles in the 
United States, the prevalence of diabetes is increasing at an alarming rate.   According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2011), approximately 25.8 million Americans (all 
ages) have this chronic condition, including 18.8 million people diagnosed with diabetes while 
7.0 million people who have diabetes but are unaware that they have the disease, or 8.3 percent 
of the U.S. population estimated to have this condition (CDC 2011).    
In 2010, an estimated 10.9 million persons, or 26.9%, aged 65 years and older in the 
United States were reported to have diabetes.  While approximately 215,000 people aged 20 or 
younger, or 0.26% of all people in this age group, were diagnosed with diabetes (type 1 or type 
2) and about 1.9 million people aged 20 years or older were newly diagnosed with diabetes 
(CDC 2011).  Given that about 35% of U.S. adults aged 20 years or older had prediabetes from 
2005-2008, based on fasting glucose or hemoglobin A1c levels, in terms of 2010 U.S. 
population, this percentage yields an estimated 79 million American adults aged 20 years or 
older with prediabetes, a condition marked by elevated blood sugar that is not yet in the diabetic 
range (CDC).  
According to data from the American Diabetes Association (ADA), in the United States 
diabetes is associated with high rates of hospitalization and a high incidence of heart disease, 
angina, myocardial infarction, end-stage-renal disease (renal failure), and non-traumatic (limbs 
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amputation), blindness among working-aged adults (American Diabetes Association, 2011).  
Furthermore, diabetes is the seventh leading cause of death in the United States based on U.S. 
death certificates in 2007 (CDC 2011).  As expected, these disabling conditions contribute to a 
severe decrease in a person’s quality of life.  For instance, the risk for death among people with 
diabetes is about twice that of people of similar age but without diabetes and it is likely to be 
underreported as a cause of death. Studies show that only 35-40% of decedents with diabetes had 
it listed anywhere on the death certificate, and only 10-15% had it listed as the underlying cause 
of death (CDC 2011).  It is projected that between 2009 and 2034, the number of people with 
diagnosed and undiagnosed diabetes will increase from 23.7 million to 44.1 million (Huang, 
Basu et al. 2009) 
Not surprisingly, diabetes is becoming one of the major public health problems because a 
great proportion of the healthcare expenditure has been spent on the treatment of its associated 
morbidity and mortality.  Case in point, people with diabetes are 21.8 times as likely to be 
admitted for skin ulcers/gangrene, 15 times as likely for peripheral vascular disease, 10 times as 
likely for congestive heart failure, and almost 10 times as likely for atherosclerosis; 
cerebrovascular accidents and heart disease are 6–10 times more common in diabetic patients 
(Gambert and Pinkstaff 2006).  In addition, diabetes occurs in all populations and age groups but 
is increasing in prevalence in the elderly and in blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asians 
(ADA 2011; CDC 2011). Due to the combined burdens and complications of diabetes, 
individuals at age 60 that are diagnosed with diabetes have a reduction in life expectancy and 
quality-of-life years of 7.3 and 11.1 years, respectively, for men, and 9.5 and 13.8 years, 
respectively, for women (Gambert and Pinkstaff 2006).  Last but not least, Diabetes’ direct 
medical costs and the indirect costs of lost productivity and premature mortality are substantial 
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costs both to society and its citizens.  According to the CDC (2011), diabetes costs a total of 
$174 billion, with $116 billion in direct medical costs and $58 billion in indirect costs (disability, 
work loss, premature mortality). Overall, the average medical expenses among people with 
diagnosed diabetes are more than 2 times higher than for people without diabetes (after adjusting 
for population age and sex differences).   
1.4 Organization of Dissertation 
This paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I provide a brief overview of the 
chronic disease diabetes and a literature review on the effects of prescription drug cost-shifting 
on healthcare expenditure among individuals with diabetes.  In Section 3, I discuss my data and 
measures.   In Section 4, I discuss the economic framework.  I will present the result with 
discussion in Section 5 and summary and major findings will be discussed in Section 6.  
Concluding remarks are offered in Section 7. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Diabetes Mellitus 
Diabetes mellitus is a metabolic disorder in which the body is unable to produce or use 
insulin, a hormone it needs to convert food into energy (ADA 2011; CDC 2011).  There are three 
types of diabetics.  Approximately 5 to 10 percent of all people with diabetes have “type 1” 
diabetes, a condition that typically begins in childhood or adolescence and requires lifelong 
insulin treatment.  The vast majority of people with diabetes, that is, 90 to 95 percent, have “type 
2” diabetes, a condition that typically develops in adults over 30 who have a family history of 
diabetes, are overweight, or are physically inactive.  Type 2 diabetes can be controlled through a 
combination of proper diet, weight loss, and exercise, although oral medications or insulin are 
often necessary.  A third type diabetes known as “gestational” develops during pregnancy and 
can have harmful effects on both the mother and child because of elevated glucose levels.  It is 
estimated that up to 4 percent of all women develop gestational diabetes during pregnancy and 
return to normal following the pregnancy.  However, these women have approximately 45 
percent of increased risk of recurrence with the next pregnancy and approximately 63 percent 
increased risk of developing type 2 diabetes in later life (CDC 2011). 
Since more people with diabetes die from complications of the disease rather than the 
disease itself, diabetes death rates alone understate the extent to which diabetes contributes to 
mortality.  Similarly, people with diabetes are often hospitalized for the complications of 
diabetes rather than for the disease itself, so estimates understate the extent of total 
hospitalizations for diabetes.   
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2.2   Medications for Diabetes 
There are three basic types of diabetes medication: 
• Oral diabetes medication 
• Insulin 
• Other injectable diabetes medicine (besides insulin) 
People diagnosed with type 1 diabetes usually undergo insulin treatment because the body 
cannot produce it while people with type 2 diabetes, whose bodies still produce some insulin, 
usually begin with oral medication to control blood sugar.  Some people with type 2 who initially 
began treatment with oral medication may eventually need to take insulin because the oral 
medications they have been taking for years are no longer effective in controlling their blood 
sugar (American College of Physicians 2007).  Also, sometimes people with type 2 diabetes may 
need to take two or three different pills, or a combination drug — one tablet that contains two 
types of medications combined.  In many cases, combination therapy is more effective than just 
using one type of drug (Chart 2.1; Sarpong and Miller 2010).  Of course, these drug therapies are 
no substitute for lifestyle modification (diet, exercise, substance abuse, just to name a few) once 
an individual has been diagnosed with diabetes. 
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Chart 2.1 Percentage of Adults with Diagnosed Diabetes Receiving Treatment with Insulin or 
Oral Medication, United States, 2007-2009 
 
Among adults with diagnosed diabetes (type 1 or type 2), 12% take insulin only, 14% take both 
insulin and oral medication, 58% take oral medication only, and 16% do not take either insulin or 
oral medication. 
 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National diabetes fact sheet: national 
estimates and general information on diabetes and prediabetes in the United States, 2011. 
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2.2.1 Types of Insulin 
There are different types of insulin available for treatments that vary in how quickly and 
how long they can control blood sugar (National Diabetes Information Clearinghouse 2008).  
Unlike oral medication, insulin is taken by injection or other ways such as syringes, injection 
pens, and insulin pumps, into the bloodstream.  They are classified on the following basis:   
• how soon it starts working (onset)  
• when it works the hardest (peak time) 
• how long it lasts in the body (duration) 
There are five classes of insulin available for injections: 
Rapid-acting--starts working within one to 20 minutes and its peak time are about one hour later 
and last for three to five hours.  
• Insulin lispro (Humalog®) 
• Insulin aspart (NovoLog®)  
Short-acting--this insulin has peak effect of four hours and works for about six hours. 
• Humulin® R  
• Novolin® R  
Intermediate-acting--this insulin starts to show its effect about 90 minutes after injection, peak 
at 4 to 12 hours and lasts for 16 to 24hours.  
• Humulin N  
• Novolin N  
Long-acting--this insulin can last up to 24 hours. 
• Insulin glargine (Lantus®)  
Premixed--a combination of either a rapid onset-fast acting or a short acting insulin and 
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intermediate acting insulin in one vial, which makes it easier to inject two different types of  
insulin at the same time.  
• Insulin lispro protamine/insulin lispro (Humalog® Mix50/50, Humalog® Mix75/25)  
• Insulin aspart protamine/insulin aspart (NovoLog® Mix 50/50, NovoLog® Mix 70/30) 
• NPH insulin/regular insulin (Humulin® 70/30, Novolin® 70/30).  
2.2.2 Other Injectable Medications 
Besides insulin, there are other injectable drugs used in the treatment of diabetes 
(American Diabetes Association 2011):  
• Pramlintide--(brand name Symlin) is a synthetic form of the hormone amylin, which is 
produced along with insulin by the beta cells in the pancreas. Users inject it with meals 
and it has been approved for people with type 1 diabetes who are not achieving their goal 
A1C levels and for people with type 2 diabetes who are using insulin and are not 
achieving their A1C goals.  
• Exenatide--(brand name Byetta), the first in a new class of drugs for the treatment of 
type 2 diabetes called incretin mimetics, works to lower blood glucose levels primarily by 
increasing insulin secretion. Like pramlintide, exenatide is injected with meals.  
Exenatide has been approved for use by people with type 2 diabetes who have not 
achieved their target A1C levels using metformin, a sulfonylurea, or a combination of 
metformin and a sulfonylurea.  
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2.2.3 Oral Medication  
Currently there are five classes of oral diabetes medications, all of which help lower  
blood sugar levels, by making the pancreas produce more insulin, helping decrease insulin 
requirements by the body or reducing gluconeogenesis (i.e. formation of glucose from 
noncarbohydrate sources, such as amino acids) by the liver. These different classes of diabetes 
medications can be used in combination or with insulin to achieve control of the blood sugar (see 
Table 2.1, Appendix B; AHRQ 2007).   
• Sulfonylureas stimulate the pancreas to make more insulin.  
• Biguanides shut off the liver's excess glucose production 
• Alpha-Glucosidase Inhibitors slow absorption of carbohydrates in the intestine 
• Thiazolidinediones increase the body's sensitivity to insulin 
• Meglitinides stimulate the pancreas to make more insulin 
These five pharmacological methods of controlling blood sugar can substantially delay or 
prevent costly medical complications arising from diabetes (Cohen, Neslusan et al. 2003). 
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2.3 Literature Review  
A literature review of research on pharmacy benefit cost cutting strategies implemented  
by employers and insurers reveals that, in 2000, 80% of health plans with prescription drug 
benefits offered 3-tier formularies compared with 36% of plans 2 years earlier (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2003).  Also, more than half of all people with prescription drug insurance were in 
three-tier plans by 2002 (Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002).  In these multi-tiered formularies plans, 
drugs are arranged into copayment tiers to create financial incentives for patients to use generic 
medicines over brand-name products or select a brand-name drug designated as “preferred” over 
“nonpreferred.” 
In 2008, findings from a survey of more than 150 employers by Buck Consultants  
revealed that 99% of the respondents offer a pharmacy benefit.  Out of these respondents, 44% 
required employees to share 21% to 30% of the medication cost while another 45% required 
employees to share 11% to 20% of the drug cost; the remaining 11% required cost sharing 
greater than 30%.  Furthermore, 72% of employers implemented a 3-tier cost-sharing structure in 
which tier 1 includes the lowest-cost generic medications, tier 2 includes preferred brands, and 
tier 3 includes nonpreferred medications.  Given that tier 1 has the lowest out-of-pocket cost for 
medications, members have a strong incentive to use tier 1 as opposed to other tiers with higher 
out-of-pocket costs for medications.  In other related studies, when plan members have higher 
copays or coinsurance amounts, their medication adherence rates decrease, contributing to 
increased medical costs and absenteeism (Davis, Collins et al. 2005). 
Shifting costs or increasing cost sharing to patients, rather than seeking innovative ways  
to reduce drug spending and thereby share a lower overall cost, could lead to patients forgoing 
valuable treatments as a result of greater cost-share if other measures are not taken to ensure that 
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patients adhere to their drug therapy. There are two possible explanations for the popularity of 
such cost-cutting strategies, e.g. the multi-tier formularies benefit.  First, many drugs that were 
excluded under the single-tier formularies are often included in drug benefits with more tiers 
(Penna 2000).  Second, research has shown that adding copayment tiers lowers drug spending, 
particularly the portion paid by health insurance plans (Motheral and Fairman 2001).   
In most of the studies that focused on the impact of tiered formularies, the findings  
revealed that adding tiers to copayments for prescription drugs in the private insurance market 
was associated with a reduction in total spending (decreases of 5%-20%) by the drug plan and 
greater spending by patients (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Gibson, McLaughlin et al. 2005; 
Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005) .  In these studies, there are 3 notable common findings: adding 
tiers to copayment structures was associated with increased switching within drug classes 
(switching toward “preferred” drugs on formulary occurring among 5% to 49.4% of patients) 
(Motheral and Fairman 2001; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; 
Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Gibson, McLaughlin et al. 2005; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005), 
decreased overall utilization of affected medicines (Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; Huskamp, 
Deverka et al. 2003; Gibson, McLaughlin et al. 2005; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005; Landsman, 
Yu et al. 2005), and either no change (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005) or an increase in the rate 
of discontinuation of prescribed drug treatments (Motheral and Fairman 2001; Fairman, 
Motheral et al. 2003; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Huskamp, Deverka 
et al. 2005; Landsman, Yu et al. 2005).  A study by Nair and colleagues found that changes in 
spending by the plan and by patients were consistent with the findings of other studies but there 
was no statistically significant associations between adding tiers to formularies and changes in 
total spending (Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003).   
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Joyce and colleagues examined the impact of multi-tiered formularies, mandatory generic  
substitution rules, and copayment levels on expenditures for generic and brand name drugs and 
patient’s out-of-pocket payments on the working-age with employer-provided drug coverage 
(Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002).   This study found that many of the new insurance mechanisms for 
prescription drugs were effective at controlling expenditures.  For example, Joyce et al. found 
that doubling copayment levels in one-, two-, and three-tier plans (i.g., moving from $5 to $10 or 
$5/$10 to $10/$20 or $5/$10/$15 to $10/$20/$30) reduced drug expenditures by 22 to 35%, 
which translates to elasticities of –0.22 to  –0.33.  Also, adding tiers reduced drug expenditures.  
Moving from a one- to two-tier plan (i.g., $5 to $5/$10 or $10 to $10/$20) reduced expenditures 
by 6 to19%.  Adding a third tier had less dramatic effects on average drug spending than adding 
a second tier, and adding mandatory generic substitution (MGS) rules to two-tier plans yielded 
expenditure reductions of about 8 percent.  Interestingly, patient’s out-of-pocket costs were not 
affected by benefit design.  Increases in patient cost-sharing were balanced by reductions in 
utilization of drugs with higher cost-sharing levels and substitution between cheaper, generic 
drugs and expensive brand name drugs.  Although patient out-of-pocket spending did not change 
when cost-sharing increased, the share of total costs borne by patient rose significantly.  
In a study of the U.S. working-age insured, Goldman et al. concluded that increased cost- 
sharing in drug benefits are associated with reduction in use of almost all therapeutic classes of 
prescription drugs (Goldman 2004).  This study focused on the impact of benefit design on drug 
expenditures and total days supplied of medications for selected chronic conditions.  Price 
elasticities of demand were estimated for both disease-specific medications and other drugs for 
the full sample and for users with chronic conditions.  As a proxy for price, an out-of-pocket 
index for each plan was generated, effectively collapsing the benefits generosity of each plan 
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into a single variable.  Patients being treated for long-term chronic conditions, such as 
hypertension, lipid disorders, depression, gastric acid disorders, and diabetes, were found to have 
demand for disease-specific drugs that was fairly price-responsive but less responsive than 
demand for drugs from outside drug classes.  In other words, increased cost-sharing in drug 
benefits reduced the use of “nonessential” drugs more than “essential” drugs.  For patients being 
treated for conditions, such as allergic rhinitis and osteoarthritis, that produce intermittent 
symptoms that can be treated with medications, demand for disease-specific drugs was very 
price-responsive, even more so than for drugs from outside classes.   
Moreover, patients without evidence of medical treatment for specific conditions were  
more price-sensitive to disease-specific drugs than those with ongoing treatment.  Elasticities for 
all drugs among the full sample ranged from –0.25 to –0.45, elasticities for disease-specific 
drugs among those with ongoing treatment ranged from –0.07 to –0.30, and elasticities for drugs 
from an outside drug class for chronically ill patients ranged from –0.14 to –0.30.  In general, 
existing research implies that price elasticity for prescription drugs is fairly inelastic (less than 
one), but that estimates do vary.  Landsman et al (2005) found similar price responses across 9 
therapeutic classes.  Several other studies found modest but inconsistent effects of higher 
copayments on use of essential and nonessential drug classes (Motheral and Henderson 1999; 
Motheral and Fairman 2001; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003). 
In another related study, Roe and colleagues (2002) compared more and less aggressive 
three –tier plans and found that those with lower copayments at each level had no overall 
savings, while more aggressive plans with higher copayments at each level had cost trends that 
increased more slowly.  Furthermore, other studies have found that shifting individuals from a 2-
tier to a 3-tier drug benefit copayment structure resulted in changes in medication utilization and 
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more aggressive cost-sharing requirements combined with other management strategies were 
associated with a shift to less costly medications (generic and mail order), and lower total 
prescription drug spending (Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003) 
Studies on prescription drugs utilization have centered on the theme of own price 
elasticity. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) found that elasticities for prescription 
drugs were not different from outpatient services, which ranged from –0.17 for coinsurance rates 
from 0% to 25% to –0.31 for coinsurance rates from 25% to 95% (Manning, Newhouse et al. 
1987).  Having found that HIE enrollees with generous insurance filled significantly more 
prescriptions than did those with less generous coverage, they concluded that "drugs, like 
medical care expenditures in general, respond to cost-sharing faced by consumers" (Leibowitz, 
Manning et al. 1985).  However, this conclusion has been widely debated on grounds that the 
HIE results cannot distinguish between the own-price effect of insurance on the covered service 
in question (prescription drugs) and the cross-price effect of coverage for services that 
complement drug therapy (physician visits). In 1989, Leibowitz published a second paper 
reporting no significant relationship between insurance plan generosity and utilization rates for 
over-the-counter medicine.  
The results about whether or not the increases in drug prices are associated with 
significant adverse health status are ambiguous.  Some studies found that rising drug prices are 
associated with increased adverse health effects (Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Tamblyn, 
Laprise et al. 2001; Heisler, Langa et al. 2004).  While other studies found no significant changes 
in health status following increased cost-sharing for prescription drugs (Pilote, Beck et al. 2002; 
Schneeweiss, Walker et al. 2002).   
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Similar results to Goldman (2004) were found in a study where survey respondents were 
asked about various cost-related reductions in use (Piette, Heisler et al. 2004).  The findings of 
this study indicated that patients reported less cost-related reductions for disease-specific drugs 
than they did for overall drugs.  Additionally, drugs for conditions with intermittent symptoms, 
such as arthritis or pain conditions, were reduced more frequently than those for life-threatening 
chronic conditions such as hypertension or heart disease. 
The price-sensitivity of elderly individuals is likely to differ from that of the working-age 
population.  Theoretically, the proportion of income spent on a product is one of several 
determinants of price-sensitivity.  Hwang et al. (2001) found that out-of-pocket spending 
increased with age and income and varied by insurance status.   Specifically, persons in the 
oldest age category (age eighty or older) spent more than five times out of pocket than did 
persons in the youngest age category (birth to nineteen years) and twice as much as persons in 
the middle age category (ages forty-five to sixty-five).  Given that outlays for prescription drugs 
account for a smaller fraction of income for the working-age insured than for the elderly or 
uninsured, it is possible that this income factor drives the elderly to be more price-sensitive.  
Conversely, elderly individuals may have a greater underlying preference for drug therapy 
because they view prescription drugs as necessary and believe that fewer substitutes exist for 
drug therapy, e.g., diet and lifestyle modifications may have less impact late in life, and thus, 
they may become less price-sensitive.  Of course then the net effect of these factors on price-
sensitivity is theoretically ambiguous. 
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2.4 Significance of This Study 
 Although previous research provides good insights in evaluating the effects of the drug 
benefit changes from some particular perspectives, a number of limitations motivated my current 
research study.  The first major issue concerns with the data used for estimation.  Some studies 
used small samples so their estimation results could be affected by serious sample selection bias.  
The second issue pertains to the fact that most previous studies used cross-sectional data.  Once 
again, the question of selection bias arises because it is difficult to control for the individual 
heterogeneity in estimating the demand for medical care by using cross-sectional data.   
The third major limitation of those prior studies is about the scope of their studies.  Most 
studies focused only on the direct effects of the rising drug prices on pharmaceutical costs and 
use in general or for general chronic conditions, not specifically on diabetes as I intend to focus 
in this study.  Depending on the substitutability of prescription drugs and other types of care, the 
increases in drug prices could potentially have spillover effects on other medical care sectors 
such as inpatient and outpatient services.  In addition, their effects on demands for medical care 
might distribute over a long term through the changing of underlying health status.   Most 
previous studies estimated static models of demand for medical care (Joyce, 2002; Huskamp, 
2003; Goldman, 2004) and the dynamic price effects on medical demand are largely left 
unexplored.  Furthermore, there is limited literature on the marginal effect of comorbidities on 
the demand for medical care.2  Pladevall et al. (2004) found that patients with diabetes and 
comorbid conditions, poor adherence to antidiabetic, lipid-lowing, and antihypertensive 
medications drug regimens resulted in poor clinical health outcomes.  Given these motivations, 
in this study, I seek to explore the dynamic cost-sharing effects on healthcare  
                                                 
2
 I used the following criteria to search for existing literature for comorbid effect of diabetes on the demand for 
medical care online:  diabetes, comorbidity, marginal effect, prescription drug demand elasticity. 
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expenditures among the individuals with diabetes, one of the most common chronic condition for 
which prescription medications exist, taking into account the comorbid effect of diabetes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
3.1 Data  
I used the 2000 and 2001 Thomson Healthcare3 MarketScan Research Database.  
MarketScan, a health care information company within the Thomson Corporation, had contracts 
with over 45 large employers for the submission of the health insurance data for their employees.  
It is the largest multi-source private sector healthcare database in the U.S., containing paid 
claims of more than 7 million privately insured individuals, and over $13 billion in annual 
healthcare expenditures.  To keep the identity of the employers and health plans confidential, 
neither employers nor health plans are identified by name in the database.  This database 
contains longitudinal data for each person, including person and family identifiers, enrollment 
history, uses of inpatient care, outpatient care and prescription drugs, health expenditure, and 
detailed health insurance coverage information from 2000 to 2001.     
There are five different files in the MarketScan database from 2000 to 2001.  In order to 
conduct a sample selection for diabetic patients, I linked information from these five different 
files:   
(1) the enrollment file, which contains patients’ demographics and detailed information 
on their health plan enrollment history;  
(2) the employer benefit plan design file, which contains summary benefit descriptions 
for major medical and prescription drug benefits for many health plans;  
(3) the outpatient pharmaceutical claims file, which contains a claim for each 
prescription filled by each person with information on days of prescription drug supplied, 
                                                 
3
 Thomson Healthcare was formerly known as MEDSTAT, located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
26 
 
 
 
national drug codes, therapeutic classes, and expenditure information including total 
payments, out-of-pocket payments made by patients, and net payments made by the 
employer; 
 (4) the outpatient service claims file, which contains individual outpatient claims 
aggregated to the level of each outpatient visit with information on diagnosis, treatment 
procedures, and payment; and  
(5) the hospital inpatient claims file, which contains individual hospital claims 
aggregated to the level of the hospital stay and provides information on diagnosis, 
treatment, and length of stay, as well as basic payment information. 
3.2 Study Design 
This retrospective cohort study utilized a quasi-experimental, pre-post with comparison 
group design, to analyze the effect of cost-shifting on healthcare expenditure among enrollees 
diagnosed with diabetes enrolled in employer-sponsored insurance plans. The principal measure 
of interest is a change in the health benefit plan.  Medical and pharmacy claims were used to 
evaluate outcomes for enrollees with a change in drug benefit plan or undergoing cost shifting in 
their pharmacy benefit coverage (the intervention group) compared with enrollees without a 
change in drug benefit plan (the comparison group).  
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3.2.1 Diabetes Sample: Identification of Enrollees with Diabetes 
To identify enrollees with diabetes in the database, I used a combination of diagnosis 
codes and drug-specific pharmacy claims. Enrollees with diabetes were identified as those who, 
between 2000 and 2001, had two or more medical claims with a diabetes diagnosis code 
according to the ICD-9 codes 250.xx or one or more prescription drug claims for an antidiabetic 
agent based on the national drug code (NDC).  
To be included in the study sample, enrollees in both the intervention and comparison 
groups had to be continuously enrolled for the entire 24-months study period (12 months before 
the plan change and 12 months after the plan change) and be greater than or equal to 18 years of 
age and less than or equal to 62 years of age at the beginning of the study period.  Using 
information from the enrollment files, I defined an anchor date from October 1, 2000 to March 
31, 2001. However, after analyzing the health benefit plan change date trend, three individuals in 
the intervention group changed their plans on November 14, 2000 and January 2, 2001 and 
January 3, 2001 while the rest of the enrollees changed their plan on January 1, 2001.  Therefore, 
I redefined the anchor date to January 1, 2001 for the intervention group4 (dropping the 
November 14, 2000 plan change) and chose a proxy anchor date of January 1, 2001 for the 
comparison group which has 1 plan throughout the 24-months study period.   
This process provides 12 months expenditure in the pre-period and post-period or a total 
of 24 months time.  Furthermore, to find enrollees with continuous enrollment with pharmacy 
benefit coverage, I examined the health plan files for evidence of prescription coverage and 
excluded any persons without drug benefits or with insufficient detail in the database during the 
entire two pre-post periods.  Figure 3.1 (a and b) shows a sketch of sample selection timeline.  
                                                 
4
 I dropped patient with November 14, 2000 changed date but kept the other two patients because all their 
expenditures for 2001 occurred after the changes to their drug benefit designs. 
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Figure 3.1 (a) Timeline for intervention group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 (b) Timeline for comparison group 
Next, using national drug code (NDC) to identify antidiabetic agents, I examined the 
outpatient pharmaceutical claims record to find persons with at least 2 pharmacy claims5 for 
antidiabetic medication in each of two periods: the pre-change (January 1, 2000, to December 
31, 2000) and the post-change (January 2, 2001, to December 31, 2001).  For the intervention 
group, the enrollees whose employers switched to new health benefit plan coverage must have 
two health benefit plans within the 24 months and the health benefit plan coverage changed on 
January 1, 2001, and remained in the same coverage structure through the rest of 2001.  The 
comparison group included enrollees whose employer remained under the same health benefit 
plan coverage structure from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2001.  All enrollees meeting the 
                                                 
5
 I imposed at least 2 pharmacy claims to ensure that the person selected did indeed have diabetes, not just a miscode 
or a one time prescription fill for some other health conditions. 
+12 Months 
 New Drug Plan Starts 
1/1/01                
0 Days 
-12 Months 
 
Period=0  
Pre-change Period 
 
 
 
Period=1 
Post-change Period 
 
+12 Months 
 Anchor Date    
1/1/01                       
0 Days 
-12 Months 
 
Period=0  
Pre-change Period 
 
 
 
Period=1 
Post-change Period 
 
29 
 
 
 
aforementioned criteria were included in the analyses of total healthcare expenditure 
(beneficiary’s copay and deductibles and remainder of the charge paid by the insurer), total out-
of-pocket expenditure (patient’s copay and deductible for pharmaceutical, inpatient and 
outpatient services) and individual out-of-pocket (pharmaceutical, outpatient and inpatient 
services). A sample of 3,257 enrollees with diabetes was identified using this algorithm; 2,447 
and 810 for the intervention and comparison groups, respectively.  Table 3.1 displays the sample 
selection details and Table 3.2 shows the drug benefit design in the pre-change and post-change 
periods.   
Table 3.1: Sample Determination 
Criterion         Individual 
 
ICD-9CM diagnosis code (250.0x) 
Aged 18-62 
Key Variable Present (drug benefit plan) 
Two Time Periods (pre-post)          
Final Sample Size (person-years)      3257 
 
Note:  Sample size is the number of individuals after selecting for each criterion.  The final 
sample is 3,257 individuals over two time periods. 
 
 In the final sample, there were 5 plan types (see Table 3.3): comprehensive, HMO, Non-
capitated point of service (POS), preferred provider organization (PPO), capitated or partial 
capitated POS; and a total of 28 plans.  In the comparison group there were 8 plans and all of 
them were comprehensive plan type with no “patient incentive to use certain providers” and no 
“primary care physician assigned.”  While in the intervention group there were 23 plans and they 
included all 5 plan type as mentioned above. 
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3.2 Drug Benefit Plan Characteristics for Intervention Group: Pre-change vs Post-change 
 
Pre-change 
Benefit Plan 
Frequency 
of plan 
Generic 
Copay-
card 
Generic 
Copay-mail 
Preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
card 
Preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
mail 
Non-
preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
card 
Non-
preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
mail 
                
Plan Group1 1 5 10 10 20 25 45 
Plan Group2 4 5 10 10 20 20 45 
Plan Group3 1 2 2 2 2     
Plan Group4 1 5 5 5 5     
Plan Group5 3 24 24 24 24     
Plan Group6 2 8 8 16 16 25 25 
                
Total No. of 
Plans 12             
 
 
Post-change 
Benefit Plan 
Frequency 
of plan 
Generic 
Copay-
card 
Generic 
Copay-
mail 
Preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
card 
Preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
mail 
Non-
preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
card 
Non-
preferred 
Brand 
Copay-
mail 
Plan Group1 4 15 30 35 70 
Plan Group2 1 10 20 20 45 
Plan Group3 1 2 2 2 2 
Plan Group4 2 5 5 5 5 
Plan Group5 3 24 24 24 24 
Plan Group6 2 16 16 25 25 
Total No. of 
Plans 13 
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3.3 Plan Type Characteristics 
Plan Type Patient 
incentive to 
use certain 
providers? 
Primary Care 
Physician 
(PCP) 
assigned? 
Referrals from 
PCP to 
specialists 
required? 
Out of 
network 
services 
covered? 
Partially or 
fully 
capitated? 
1  COMP no no n/a n/a no 
2  HMO yes yes yes no yes 
3  Non-cap  
    POS 
yes yes yes yes no 
4  PPO yes no n/a yes no 
5 Cap or  
    Part Cap  
    POS 
yes yes yes yes yes 
 
3.2.2 Methodological Approach 
I seek to answer two questions:   
(1) Do changes in drug benefit design have a significant effect on patient out-of-pocket (copays 
and deductible) drug expenditure among individuals with diabetes in large employer-sponsored 
insurance plans?  
Hypothesis I: 
H0:   The out-of-pocket expenditure for drug is the same in the intervention group with a 
change in drug benefit design and the comparison group without a change in drug 
benefits coverage.         
H1:   The out-of-pocket expenditure for drug is different in the intervention group with a 
change in drug benefit design and the comparison group without a change in drug 
benefits coverage.     
 (2) If this relationship holds, what is the impact of changes in drug benefit design on the total 
healthcare expenditure (sum of both employer and enrollee’s cost for all three services), 
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individual service expenditure for each of the three services, total out-of-pocket (the sum of 
patient’s copays and deductible for pharmaceutical, outpatient and inpatient services) and 
individual out-of-pocket for pharmaceutical, outpatient and inpatient services?   
Hypothesis II: 
H0:   The expenditures (total healthcare expenditure, total out-of-pocket and individual 
out-of-pocket for inpatient and outpatient services) are the same in the intervention group 
with a change in drug benefit design and the comparison group without a change in drug 
benefits design.         
H1:   The expenditures (total healthcare expenditure, total out-of-pocket and individual 
out-of-pocket) are different in the intervention group with a change in drug benefit design 
and the comparison group without a change in drug benefits design.         
In this investigation, a strong assumption is made regarding the key variable of interest, 
changes in drug benefit design:  
Assumption (Causality):  
An increase in employees’ share of expenditure and a decrease in total healthcare expenditure 
(employees plus employers’ share of expenditure) must be due to a change in inputs or input mix 
which is broadly defined as changes in drug benefit design implemented by the employers as a 
way for employers to shift cost to employees. 
 
I expect that this assumption can be justified in the dynamic employer-sponsored health 
benefit setting via appropriate statistical analysis.  The design of this research is to use a 
longitudinal data with a focus on patient population facing a similar array of drug choices, that is, 
people diagnosed with diabetes and using antidiabetic agents.  I am limiting my unit of analysis 
to individuals with diabetes to reduce sources of heterogeneity.  The data covers the time period 
2000–2001. The response variables are total healthcare expenditures, total out-of-pocket 
expenditures, and individual expenditure per service per enrollee, and individual out-of-pocket 
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expenditure per service per enrollee for the diabetes population, obtained from the 
pharmaceutical, outpatient and inpatient services files.  To measure the effect of changes in 
benefit plan coverage on each of the response variables, generalized estimating equations were 
used, whereby the relationship between the response and covariates is modeled separately from 
the correlation between repeated measurements on the same individual (Diggle 2002). 
3.3 Measures  
3.3.1 Response Measures: Direct Cost of Diabetes 
From the insurers’ perspective of the analysis, direct costs were reimbursements from the 
insurer to health care providers for inpatient, outpatient, physician, and prescription drug 
services, as well as for other services (e.g., physical therapy, nursing home services).  Costs were 
reported based on claims for services provided in 2000 and 2001.  Patients’ out-of-pocket (e.g., 
copays and deductibles) are included for the patients’ perspective of the analysis.  All 
expenditures for each year were adjusted using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and all estimates 
in this dissertation are reported in 2001 dollars.  
The main response variables are total healthcare expenditure, total out-of-pocket 
expenditure, individual service expenditure for each of the three services, and individual out-of-
pocket expenditure for each of the three services.  Out-of-pocket expenditure on prescription 
drugs, outpatient services, and inpatient services are calculated as the yearly spending per 
diabetic enrollee, while total out-of-pocket expenditure is the sum of the out-of-pocket 
expenditure on prescription drugs, outpatient services, and inpatient services.  Individual service 
expenditure is the sum of spending by the insurer in the database and the required out-of-pocket 
spending by the patient for each of the service (drugs, outpatient services, and inpatient services).  
Total healthcare expenditure is the sum of spending by the insurer in the database and the 
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required out-of-pocket spending by the patient for prescription drugs, outpatient services, and 
inpatient services.  
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
The primary explanatory variable of interest involves changes in benefit plan design for 
prescription drugs.  In the presence of health insurance, the price faced by a diabetic patient for 
health services is determined by the diabetic patient’s health plan benefit design.   
3.3.3 Covariates 
Other explanatory variables associated with healthcare expenditure were included in the 
models.  Patient-level sociodemographic characteristics included sex, age, urban residence, and 
median income in the patient’s area of residence (by ZIP code) from the US Census files.  Both 
income and residence (i.e. urban or rural) were obtained using employee county zip code 
provided in the dataset to link to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) (USDA, 
Economic Research Service 2004).  I also included region to control for geographic 
characteristic.  In addition, a comorbidity score, using Elixhauser comorbidity measures, was 
calculated to be included in the analysis to explore its effect on the outcomes. 
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3.4 Identification of Conditions Comorbid with Diabetes 
To gain a better understanding of the effect of comorbidities on diabetes related cost, I 
identified comorbidities as recognized in the literature to drive medical costs, morbidity, and 
mortality in diabetes in both the intervention and comparison groups (CDC 2009; ADA, 2007; 
ADA, 2011; Simpson, Corabian et al. 2003; O'Brien, Shomphe et al. 1998; Hodgson and Cohen 
1999; Ramsey, Newton et al. 1999).  These conditions included cardiovascular disease, 
hypertension, infections related to diabetes (e.g., septicemia, bacteremia), other metabolic 
diseases (e.g., hyperosmolarity), nephropathy, neuropathy, and retinopathy.  I used the 
Elixhauser method which uses ICD-9-CM codes and has been shown to predict mortality and 
hospitalization outcomes (see Table 3.4, Appendix) (Elixhauser, Steiner et al. 1998; Southern, 
Quan et al. 2004).  In contrast to the Charlson Score, the original Elixhauser method involves 
retaining individual binary indicators for each disease category (rather than creating a summary 
score by adding indicators for all diseases).  As an alternative to the original Elixhauser method, 
I summed all of the indicators to create a total Elixhauser score (Dominick, Dudley et al. 2005)6  
I performed a search over the analysis period of year 2000 and 2001 for ICD-9 codes 
related to each comorbidities as indicated, whereby an Elixhauser Comorbidity score was 
calculated by summing the indicators of the comorbidity diagnosis from the inpatient and 
outpatient services claims data for each patient. Scores on the Elixhauser comorbidity measures, 
a numeric scale reflecting the risk of death or serious disability in the next year based on the 
presence of a diagnosis for 1 of 30 conditions (e.g., heart disease, cancer, depression) were 
included for the intervention group and comparison group in all the regression models 
(Elixhauser, Steiner et al. 1998).     
                                                 
6
 Since my analysis is on diabetes, in summing the Elixhauser score, I subtracted 2 comorbidities (diabetes with 
chronic complications and diabetes without chronic complications) from the measures to get a total of 28 out of 30 
comorbidities (see Table 3.2, Appendix). 
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3.5 Sample Characteristics 
Table 3.5 shows patient characteristics in terms of key variables (refer to Appendix, 
Table 3.6, for more details of the sample population).  The summary of sample characteristics is 
produced for the overall study population who satisfy the inclusion criteria. The classification is 
made on the basis of changes in drug benefit coverage status.  Change in drug benefit coverage 
category is the intervention group, whereas no change in drug benefit coverage category is the 
comparison group. The first two rows report the mean and standard deviation of pre- and post- 
period total expenditures for the intervention and comparison groups. Presumably, the pre-period 
mean expenditure should not be significantly different for intervention and control groups as 
indicated by the t-test.  
Table 3.5: Sample Characteristics by Changes in Drug Benefit Design 
Comparison Group Intervention Group t statisitc 
  
N=810 N=2,447 
  
Variables Mean            Std Dev Mean              Std Dev   
Pre Total Expenditure   4220.47                 4011.81                                      4456.34              6345.07    -1.24 
Post Total Expenditure   6573.15                11039.91  4827.03              6451.19    4.27*** 
Age in years        46.54                     10.79       48.69                   9.99   -5.05*** 
Elixhauser comorbidity score          0.22                       0.92         2.78                   6.40 -19.11*** 
Income by zip code 29223.99                  7950.03 30872.22             7507.97 -5.18*** 
Residence (urban) (No. (%)) 786 (97.04) 2412 (98.57) -2.39* 
 
For the comparison group, anchor date is set to January 1, 2001 as the intervention group.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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CHAPTER 4 
Conceptual Framework 
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
 According to economic theory, a rational patient’s consumption of an optimal amount of 
the drug, given preferences and income constraints, depends on his or her assessment of the full 
price of a prescription drug and the drug’s benefits and adverse effects.  Specifically, the theory 
assumes that rational patients will weigh the costs and benefits of drugs versus other methods of 
producing health and will consume combinations of these that maximize their health, subject to 
their income constraints.  From this utility maximization framework, economists can derive a 
demand curve for a specific good that is a function of its price, the price of all other goods, and 
the consumer’s income.  For normal goods, the derived relationship between price and quantity 
is negative, a result often referred to as “downward sloping” demand. 
From a health economics perspective, in principle, there are two different views on the 
demand for healthcare. One suggestion is that the individual demands healthcare as an input into 
her production of health--sometimes referred to as the Grossman model (Grossman 1972).  The 
Grossman model suggests that the demand for health care is a derived demand in the process of 
investment in health capital, thus, it views healthcare as an input along with other health inputs 
such as nutrition and personal exercise.  Since good health is a desired outcome according to the 
model, individuals may purchase inputs that improve their health, such as prescription drugs or 
other medical services, because health is a depreciating stock in which individuals must invest 
over time.  As a result, the demand for prescription drugs is a derived demand from the demand 
for good health.  It follows that, given a patient’s utility function or “preferences set,” all other 
things equal, the demand for prescription drugs is a function of a drug’s price, the price of other 
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inputs, including other drugs, and a patient’s income.  Since the price of prescription drugs is 
itself a function of one’s insurance status and level of pharmacy benefits, this theory implies that 
insurance status and pharmacy benefits’ level of generosity (i.e. cost-shifting or greater cost-
sharing level) will affect a consumer’s choice. 
An alternative view to the Grossman model sees the demand for health care within a 
principal-agent framework (Zweifel and Manning 2000). Thus, the individual decides if and 
when to seek health care while the provider of the services decides how much care to use once 
the first decision has been taken. Depending on the particular view of the demand for health care 
that one adopts, the methods for analyzing the effect on the demand for healthcare will vary. 
That is, the effect of health benefits on the demand for prescription drug spending by assuming 
the change in the benefit is imposed by the employers to shift cost to the employees as opposed 
to treating the change in benefit plans due to employees’ self-selection of health benefit plans. 
The role of insurance in health financing has twofold.  The first one to raise revenues for 
health care services, while the second is to pool these resources so that health risks can be 
effectively shared among the members of the insurance scheme (Folland, Goodman et al. 2007). 
Risk sharing is both an equitable and an effective way of financing health care due to the 
uncertainty of individual risk of ill health in the population.  This is especially important to 
public policies that are attempting to overcome health insurance to improve access to care and to 
reduce individual spending at the time of use, which is essential for those with limited ability to 
pay for their care. Given the different ways of analyzing the effect of health insurance on 
utilization and expenditures, whereby the findings depend on the researcher’s view of demand on 
health care, the extent to which the relationship between the price of health care and 
consumption occurs in any given context is an empirical issue, given other factors such as 
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indirect costs (i.e. transportation).  Although there are other problems associated with health 
insurance, including moral hazard and adverse selection, this is not the subject of analysis in this 
paper.  
4.2 Hypotheses 
Based on these theoretical underpinnings, this section presents hypotheses about the 
effect of employer shifting cost via changing drug benefit plan coverage to the employees in a 
population diagnosed with diabetes.  Previous research has shown that patients with prescription 
drug benefits have incentives to consume more drugs than they would normally consume 
because patients are paying only a fraction of the full drug price (Pauly 1968; Pauly 2004). 
What is the effect of the price of prescription drug on the demand for pharmaceutical services? 
According to the law of demand, there is an inverse relationship between the quantity demanded 
of a commodity and its price.  Given the existing literature on the price elasticity of prescription 
drug and the assumption that this prescription drug therapy is considered as “essential 
medication” for treating diabetic, the price elasticity is relatively inelastic or less than 1.  With 
two years of data, I expect that when an employer shifts cost to an employee by raising the price 
of the drug, the employee’s out-of-pocket drug expenditure will increase, but the total drug 
expenditure which included both the patient and the employer’s share indicated by the benefit 
plan’s payment will decrease. 
What is the effect of the price of prescription drug on the demand for inpatient services? 
I predict that shifting cost to the employees via a relatively higher co-payment required for 
pharmaceutical services will increase the consumption of inpatient services, thus, the out-of 
pocket for inpatient services will increase but the total inpatient services expenditure, including 
patient’s out-of-pocket plus employer’s share indicated by the benefit plan’s payment, will 
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decrease.  A chronically ill patient will continue to demand inpatient service to some degree 
depending on the severity of his or her condition and comorbid conditions. 
What is the effect of the price of prescription drug on the demand for outpatient services? 
I assume that for a patient to obtain prescription for a prescription drug this patient must visit his 
or her physician only when the prescription drug needs to be filled, not on a regular basis where 
he or she has to receive treatment as an outpatient to help manage his or her diabetes.   I 
anticipated that the relationship between prescription drug price and outpatient service is 
complementary but weak or negative and slightly below zero.  Thus, the higher copayment level 
for prescription drug will decrease patient’s out-of-pocket spending for outpatient services and 
the total outpatient services expenditure that included both patient and employer’s spending. 
4.3 Empirical Strategy 
This section includes a discussion on some theoretical background on the empirical 
analysis of health care expenditure.  In general, health economists are interested in modeling a 
response variable Y as a function of a vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xp) T  of covariates in a regression 
model for the mean function µ(x) ≡ E(Y |X = x) to estimate the effect of one or more of the 
covariates Xj on Y. This marginal effect is measured by a general functional of µ(x): the partial 
derivative of µ(x) with respect to covariate xj in vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xp)T.  Denoted by Dj(µ; x) 
≡ ∂µ(x)/∂xj, this parameter is the rate of change in µ(X) with respect to Xj evaluated at X = x. 
When Xj is an indicator variable (i.e. pre-change=0 and post-change=1), Dj(µ; x−j ) is defined as 
the difference in µ(x) at the two levels of Xj , i.e. Dj(µ; x−j ) ≡ µ(xj = 1, x−j ) − µ(xj = 0, x−j ), where 
x
−j is the vector x without xj (Basu and Rathouz 2005).    
As noted by Greene, this parameter is called the marginal effect of the covariate and is 
given by ξj ≡ EX {Dj(µ; X)}  (Greene, 2000, p. 824).  Thus, it is the population average rate of 
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change in µ(X) with respect to Xj, controlling for other factors X−j. When Xj is a binary indicator 
variable, the parameter of interest is the incremental effect given by  
πj≡ EX−j {Dj (µ; X−j )}, where the expected value is over X−j , marginally with respect to Xj.  The 
parameter πj is the population average contrast in the mean of Y for Xj = 1 (i.e. post-change 
period) and Xj = 0 (i.e. pre-change period).  Once more, the expectation is taken over X, but as Xj 
is fixed at 0 or 1 in Dj(µ; X−j ), πj only involves the marginal distribution of X−j . The 
interpretation of both ξj and πj are as effects of Xj on the mean of, adjusting for all other 
covariates in the model, where this adjustment is to the population distribution of X.  In the case 
of linearity, where µ(x) is linear in xj, either ξj or πj is simply equal to βj.  
Many response variables in health economics are characterized by non-negative values, 
heteroscedasticity, heavy skewness in the right tail, and kurtotic distributions.  Thus, it is 
inappropriate to apply ordinary least square (OLS) on the raw scale of Y, the response variable.  
Traditionally, to overcome such problems, econometricians have relied on logarithmic or other 
transformations of Y.  This is then followed by regression of the transformed Y on X using OLS 
(Box and Cox 1964).  However, such practice can potentially create biased estimators of µ(x) 
unless the researcher spent considerable effort to discern the specific forms of heteroscedasticity.  
Moreover, the OLS based models with logged response variable are less precise than GLM for 
certain data generating processes (Manning and Mullahy 2001). 
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4.3.1 Generalized Linear Model (GLM) 
Due to such problems of retransformation, economists have focused on the use of 
generalized linear models (GLMs) with quasi-likelihood estimation (Wedderburn 1974).  In the 
GLM approach, a link function relates µ(x) to a linear specification xT β of covariates. By using 
this approach, the retransformation problem is eliminated because µ(x) is transformed instead of 
Y.  If the response function is exponential, the conditional mean of the marginal effect can be 
denoted as:   
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     (4-1) 
Another advantage to using this method is that GLMs allow for heteroscedasticity through a 
variance structure relating Var(Y |X = x) to the mean, with correct specification the  
estimators are efficient (Crowder 1987) and may correspond to an underlying distribution of the 
response measure.   
4.3.2 Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) 
In health economics, many studies have used log link models with the gamma error 
distribution as their choice of model (Blough, Madden et al. 1999; Manning and Mullahy 2001; 
Basu, Manning et al. 2004).  Even though this is the case, it is still a challenge for researchers to 
identify the appropriate link function and variance structure a priori (Blough, Madden et al. 
1999; Manning and Mullahy 2001) because there is little guidance on the functional form of µ(x) 
or about distributional characteristics of Y given X.  The generalized estimating equations (GEE), 
introduced by (Liang and Zeger 1986), is a method of analyzing correlated data that otherwise 
could be modeled as a generalized linear model. As an extension of the independence estimating 
equations (GLM), correlated data using GEE are modeled using the same link function, linear 
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predictor setup (systematic component), variance function, and additional covariance structure of 
the correlated components.   
In this framework, the covariance structure does not need to be specified correctly to get 
reasonable regression coefficients and standard errors.  The model for GEE forms like GLM 
except with no full specification of the joint distribution and thus no likelihood function: 
g(µi)=xiTβ.  These data sets can arise from longitudinal studies, in which subjects are measured at 
different points in time, or from clustering, in which measurements are taken on subjects who 
share a common characteristic such as belonging to the same litter. 
 Let Yij , where j=1,…, ni, and i=1,.., K, represent the jth measurement on the ith subject.  
These are ni measurements on subject i and total measurements 
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The solution to the GEE gives a consistent estimate of β that is asymptotically multivariate 
normal with covariance matrix 
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4.3.3 Model Specification 
In examining the effect of employers shifting cost via changing drug benefit plan design 
to the employees, I begin by presenting a general representation of my model.  In this analysis, 
the correlated measures are pre- and post-period individual expenditure and GEE are a suitable 
technique for the data.  The response variable (total healthcare expenditure, total out-of-pocket 
expenditure, individual out-of-pocket expenditure for pharmaceutical services, outpatient 
services and inpatient services), is expressed as a function of benefit plan change (treat), time 
effect (post), interaction term for plan change conditional on time effect (treat*post), 
comorbidities (comorb), gender, age, urban or rural (residence), and income using marginal log 
link regression models with the gamma error distribution in GEE as discussed above: 
loge (µi) = α + β1treat+ β2post+ β3treat*post+β4comorb + β5gender + β6age + β7residence +  
                β8income+ β9region      (4-4) 
As mentioned above, GEE involves specifying a marginal mean model relating the 
response to the covariates and a plausible correlation structure between responses at different 
time periods (or within each cluster, i.e. treat).  The resulting parameter estimates are consistent 
irrespective of the underlying true correlation structure, but may be inefficient when the 
correlation structure is misspecified (Diggle 2002).  Moreover, GEE parameter estimates are also 
sensitive to outliers (Qu, Lindsay et al. 2000; Diggle 2002).  
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4.3.4 Analytical Work 
Finally, data analysis was carried out in order to estimate the associated expenditure or 
cost of the changes in drug benefit plan. The costs associated with each of the response variables 
were estimated vis-à-vis the comparison group as explained above. In order to calculate the cost 
associated with treat (intervention group), intervention group were pooled with comparison 
group. A dichotomous variable (treat=1|0) was created to indicate intervention group (treat=1) 
and comparison group (treat=0). The variable treat was the main variable of interest here. 
Regression using GEE estimation technique was used for the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
5.1 Expenditure by Changes in Drug Benefit Design Status 
The expenditures were found using regression method adjusting for age, incomes, 
residence (urban vs rural) and Elixhauser comorbidity score.  Using the estimates from 
regression models, expenditures were predicted for each observation. Then predicted 
expenditures are averaged by changes in drug benefit design or the intervention group status. 
Following common practice and existing literature, a value of $1 was added to all zeroes values 
encountered dependent variables to avoid undefined solutions for the log of zero (Powers et al. 
2005; Diehr et al. 1999).  All regression models are reported in log and marginal effect.   
Referring back to Chapter 3, Table 3.5 shows the plan expenditure for the baseline year 
(2000) and the intervention year (2001) as well as the difference in expenditure for the 
intervention group that changed due to changes in drug benefit design relative to its comparison 
group.  The mean baseline age is 48.69 and 46.54 for the intervention group and comparison 
group, respectively.  A little more than half of the intervention group and comparison group were 
male, 57% and 59% respectively.  The majority of enrollees in both groups reside in the urban 
areas.  Geographically, the vast majority of the patients in the comparison group live in the north 
central while the intervention group is concentrated in the northeast, north central and south 
region. 
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5.1.1 Total Expenditure 
Table 5.1 shows the estimated results from the full regression model for total healthcare 
expenditure and total out-of-pocket expenditure for all services (pharmaceutical, outpatient and 
inpatient services).  These are estimates of expenses for the post period (2001) following changes 
in drug benefit design. The regression equation included all covariates selected in the data 
summary Table 5.6, Appendix.  The estimation of coefficients and their implied values (the 
marginal effect) in dollar terms are also presented. For total healthcare expenditure, the estimates 
for changes in drug benefit design conditional on time effect (plan*year) and time effect are 
significant even below the 1% level, while for total out-of pocket expenditure the interaction 
term and time effect was not significant but the plan change is significant below 1% level.  For 
total healthcare expenditure, in 2001 dollar terms, the plans with changes to health benefit design 
dependent on time (on average) spent about $1,532.32 less in 2001 than the plans without 
changes to health benefit design dependent on time.  For total out-of-pocket expenditure, 
individuals with changes to health benefit design (on average) spent about $96.67 more in 2001 
than individuals without changes to health benefit design.  A possible explanation for this may be 
that changes in drug benefit design have shifted a larger burden of medical care to the patients, 
and thus they would have higher total out-of-pocket expenditure.  However, the interaction term 
for plan change and time appears to be not significant because this is a one-year follow-up or 
short-term analysis that may not be able to detect the time effect on total out-of-pocket spending. 
In the total healthcare expenditure model, gender, age and comorbidity score are 
significant below the 1% level.  The comorbidity score indicates that the spending in the plan 
increases significantly for diabetic patients with comorbidities , i.e. by a margin of $177.75 on 
average.  However, the place of residence does not appear to have a significant effect on plans’ 
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spending. It may be that diabetes is indiscriminate in its effect and is a chronic illness that 
requires medical attention, thus, incurring spending irrespective of the individual’s level of 
income or residence.  In terms of geographic location, individuals living in the south have a 
significant effect on total healthcare expenditure and those living in the west have an impact on 
total out-of-pocket expenditure models below the 5% level, that is, enrollees living in the south 
spent on average $556.36 less than those living in northeast and those living in the west spent 
$74.81 more than those living in the northeast, respectively.  
Looking at the result from the total out-of-pocket regression model, as employers shift 
cost to the employees, older enrollees aged 45 to 62 are likely to reduce their spending on 
average than the younger enrollees, 18 to 44 year olds (age category of 18 – 34 is the omitted 
category).  Income appears to be a significant predictor for total out-of-pocket expenditure but 
not for total healthcare expenditure.  Similarly to the result in the total healthcare expenditure 
model, the Elixhauser comorbidity score is a significant predictor of overall out-of-pocket 
spending. 
5.1.2 Individual Services Expenditure 
The results in Table 5.2 and 5.3 show changes in benefit plan design conditional on time 
to be a significant predictor for all three models (drug, inpatient, outpatient services).  
Specifically, relative to the comparison group’s spending in drug, inpatient and outpatient 
services, the intervention group is more likely to decrease spending on average by $160.46, 
4949.64 and $364.41, respectively.  To a certain extent, geographical location appears to be a 
significant predictor for inpatient (i.e. south) but not for drug spending and outpatient services 
spending.  Again, the comorbidity score is a significant predictor for increased spending in all 
three services below 1% level.   
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The parameter estimates from the total drug spending equation indicate that gender and 
age have significant impact on total drug spending increase.  For example, female patients spent 
$374.47 more on average than male patients and older patients have higher drug spending on 
average than younger patients, i.e. 18-34.  However, in the total outpatient spending regression 
model, only enrollees in the middle age group or older have a significant impact on spending.  
These age groups are likely to decrease spending on average as their employers increasingly shift 
cost to them.  Some studies have suggested that shifting cost to the patients may lead to lower 
medication adherence which could further intensify the disease, thus, resulting in higher demand 
for inpatient services. However,  the result from the total inpatient spending model shows no 
apparent implication of such relationship, which could be due to the fact that  this is a short-term 
analysis (2000-2001) focusing on chronically ill patients with diabetes whose medications are 
considered as essential medications as discussed previously.  In the regression model for total 
outpatient spending, whether a patient is a female from any income level living in the urban area 
or not appears to have no significant impact on total outpatient expenditure.  While in the total 
inpatient spending model, whether a patient is a female from any age group and in any income 
level appears to have no significant impact on total inpatient expenditure. 
5.1.3 Individual Services Out-of-Pocket Expenditure 
In the models for out-of-pocket expenditure for each service, the main variable of 
interest, changes in drug benefit plan, has a significant effect on only drug and inpatient out-of-
pocket spending, not out-of-pocket spending for outpatient services.  However, the interaction 
term indicates a significant effect on drug and outpatient services out-of-pocket spending but not 
on inpatient services out-of-pocket spending.  Table 5.4 and 5.5 display the parameter estimates 
for all three response variables.  I assume that the changes in drug benefit design were imposed 
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by the employers to shift cost to the employees as part of their cost cutting strategy.  Therefore, 
the estimate for the main variable of interest in the drug model show that patients undergoing 
changes in their drug benefit design are now faced with a higher cost so they are expected to 
have higher out-of-pocket drug spending on average by $79.36 relative to the comparison group. 
The effect of time on changes in plan shows that the out-of-pocket drug spending was associated 
with an increase but by a smaller amount ($15.64).  The outpatient model indicates that changes 
in drug benefit plan conditional on time appear to be a significant predictor but the effect is 
relatively small.   
Although comorbidity score continues to be a significant predictor for inpatient and 
outpatient out-of-pocket spending, not drug, its effect on spending is small.  Except for 
outpatient, both drug and inpatient out-of-pocket spending models show that out-of-pocket 
spending increased but varied by geographic location.  In the drug out-of-pocket spending, 
female diabetics and middle age diabetics are likely to decrease their drug out-of-pocket 
spending because they are faced with a higher price for prescription drugs, although the effect is 
relatively small.  As noted in the literature review, given that outlays for prescription drugs 
account for a smaller fraction of income for the working-age insured than for the elderly or 
uninsured, it is possible that this income factor drives the elderly to be more price-sensitive.  
However, elderly individuals may have a greater underlying preference for drug therapy because 
they view prescription drugs as necessary and believe that fewer substitutes exist for drug 
therapy, e.g., diet and lifestyle modifications may have less impact late in life, and thus, they 
may become less price-sensitive.  In the analysis of out-of-pocket spending for outpatient 
services, only gender and ages 45 and over have a significant effect, whereby female patient are 
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likely to increase out-of-pocket spending while older patients are likely to reduce out-of-pocket 
spending for outpatient services   
5.2 Discussion and Conclusion 
The main purpose of this empirical analysis is to gain insights into the health care 
spending behavior of a chronically ill population diagnosed with diabetes by analyzing changes 
in drug benefit design imposed by employers, all things considered.  Without pinpointing a 
particular aspect and doing a complex analysis, the database is allowed to speak for itself. The 
observations made from the data are interesting and have notable findings.  However, caution 
should be taken when interpreting the results because I imposed the assumption that changes in 
drug benefit plans are due to the action of the employers as part of their cost shifting strategy and 
no other assumptions are made regarding to the details of the pre-changed and post-changed drug 
benefit plans.  No special statistical tests were conducted to make inferences about the 
differences because the changes were fairly substantial and obvious.  
The analysis shows that changes in drug benefit design decreased spending compared 
with spending in a comparison group across a diverse variety of benefit types and benefit 
changes; conversely, decreasing copayment level increased the spending.  For instance, total 
health care spending for diabetes care in the intervention group decreased on average by 
$1,532.32 relative to the comparison group during the study period from 2000 to 2001; at the 
same time, drug out-of-pocket spending has increased on average by $160.46 . 
Previous studies on the relationship between incentive formularies or cost shifting or 
greater cost-sharing and overall drug spending have produced various results (Hillman, Pauly et 
al. 1999; Motheral and Fairman 2001; Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; 
Gibson, McLaughlin et al. 2005; Gibson, Ozminkowski et al. 2005).  A study by Joyce and 
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colleagues (2002) analyzed cross-sectional differences in prescription drug spending in a sample 
of 25 firms with a variety of different pharmaceutical benefit arrangements.  They found that 
enrollees in 3-tiered plans had lower total prescription drug spending and that such plans shifted 
cost from the insurer to the enrollee which is similar to my findings. Unlike my study, they 
included specific details about the plan types and they estimate predicted spending in 2- or 3-tier 
plans with substantially higher copayments (eg,$10/$20 or $10/$20/$30) to be more than 30% 
less than spending in a 1-tier plan with a low copayment ($5).  Moreover, they found that the 
absolute amount of out-of-pocket spending did not vary significantly according to benefit type, 
but that the share of total spending to the patient increased; and, Joyce et al inferred changes in 
spending, rather than followed changes in the population, based on cross-sectional analyses.   
Another related study by Motheral and Fairman (2001) examined effects of switching 
from a 2-tier to a 3-tier benefit compared with a control population that did not switch benefits. 
This is similar to my study where I have an intervention group with changes in drug benefit 
designs and comparison group without changes in drug benefit design. They found a 7% 
decrease in overall expenditures. Similarly, Gibson and colleagues (2005), using data from the 
mid-990s, analyzed the effect of an increase in copayments at a single firm compared with a 
control firm and found that utilization decreased by approximately 10%, but seemed to moderate 
with time. 
The result in my study is therefore consistent with findings from existing literature in 
showing a symmetric result of decreased spending associated with an increase in copayments, 
thus, lending more weight to my findings.  As previously discussed, there are potential risks to 
the health of the patients with greater cost sharing.  A considerable number of studies have 
suggested that incentive formularies are associated with increased discontinuation rates and 
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decreased consistency of use, which raises health concerns, especially in the chronically ill 
population whose medications are essential (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Landsman, Yu et al. 
2005).  However, the direction and overall magnitude of this effect are not clear.  The prior 
literature on substitution effects is mixed and other studies observed no change in generic fill 
rates (Leibowitz, Manning et al. 1985; Motheral and Fairman 2001).  
This study is subject to several limitations. First, I assumed that changes in drug benefit 
design are imposed by the employers as a way for them to shift cost to the employees, thus, 
reducing the overall spending in the benefit plan while increasing the employees’ out-of-pocket 
spending for drug.  I focused on individuals aged 18 to 62 enrolled in large-employer sponsored 
health insurance plans.  Therefore, these results may not generalize to the elderly, the poor, or the 
uninsured individuals. Second, my study was limited to a single year of follow-up after the 
introduction of the new pharmacy benefit. Further analyses are needed to address the long-run 
effect and the dynamic relationship of health benefits and patients’ health outcome in chronically 
ill population, particularly diabetes.  Third, this analysis did not adjust for clustering within 
employer group. That was because I was most interested in differences between comparison 
groups, with no change in drug benefit designs, from the intervention group with changes in drug 
benefit designs. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY OF STUDY AND FINDINGS  
Both direct and indirect costs of the treatment and management of diabetes are known to 
be sizable.  According to a November, 2010 report released, by UnitedHealth Group Inc, one of 
the nation’s largest health insurers, it says that it will have a lot more health costs to pay in 
coming years because of diabetes (UnitedHealth, The United States of Diabetes 2010).  The 
study predicted that the majority of Americans could have diabetes or pre-diabetes by 2020, at a 
cost of $3.35 trillion to the health care system over the next 10 years.  Also, it reported that 
within 10 years, the disease will account for about a tenth of total health care spending, at an 
annual cost of $500 billion, up from an estimated $194 billion this year.  In the report, 
UnitedHealth notably calls for more medication and care compliance programs, citing the 
Diabetes Control Program it conducts with community pharmacists as an example. 
Thus, economic issues are becoming more important to consider in today’s health care 
environment. Studies at a detailed disease level such as this study could provide useful guidance 
to the optimal design of prescription drug insurance benefits because increasing cost sharing to 
the patients is not always a benign instrument, and at times, it may come at a price.  Although the 
empirical findings are not consistent in the current literature, some studies indicated that higher 
levels of cost sharing are associated with treatment disruption for chronically ill patients who 
depend on a regular regimen of prescription drugs.  Moreover, higher levels of cost sharing can 
have significant effects on the use of essential medications, the outcomes of care, and the process 
of care.   
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6.1 Study Design and Organization of the Analysis  
This study uses a retrospective research design with observational historical data.  In 
order to ensure precision and reduce the potential for heterogeneity, it uses only specific group of 
patients with a specific condition.  The subjects are individuals enrolled in large employer-
sponsored health insurance plans ages 18 to 62 who were diagnosed with diabetes from 2000 to 
2001.  Specifically, this study seeks to measure the association between changes in drug benefit 
design and health care spending in a population diagnosed with diabetes.  The effect of changes 
in drug benefit design is found as a consequence of employers cost shifting strategy on health 
care expenditures.  
The analysis of this study relies on the assumption that changes in spending are caused by 
changes in the drug benefit plan resulting from the action of employers as they seek different 
ways to cut cost. Although there are no details provided regarding the different drug benefit 
types, this study provides a general sense of how shifting cost to employees by raising the 
copayment levels could have a significant impact on the overall spending in the insurance plans 
and on the patients even in a chronically ill population in the short-term, i.e. one year.  Also, this 
study has shed some light on drug benefit design as a predictor of drug spending and overall 
expenditure to the employers and insurers even in chronically ill patients who depend on a 
regular regimen of prescription drugs.       
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6.2 Major Findings  
All estimated costs are in 2001 dollars and costs, measured by expenditure or spending in 
the plans and patients, are all related to diabetes care, management or treatment. Growth of 
expenditures by changes in drug benefit design was estimated for the intervention group relative 
to the comparison group who did not have changes to the plan.  The average follow-up year 
incremental out-of-pocket spending for drug following the changes in drug benefit design for an 
individual in the intervention group was $15.64.  The overall effect on total healthcare 
expenditure was a reduction of $1,532.32 on average in the intervention group relative to the 
comparison group.  
The findings suggest that the decrease in total health care expenditure borne mostly by 
the employers and insurers is explained by changes in drug benefit plan design during the study 
period from 2000 to 2001.  Thus, higher levels of cost sharing transfer a large financial burden to 
the patient.  All things considered, if all changes in healthcare spending are broadly defined as 
changes in drug benefit design imposed by the employers, then such changes are effective in 
managing the demand side of healthcare cost even in a chronically ill population who depends on 
regular drug therapy.  However, these findings raise concern that cost shifting could lead to 
adverse health consequences, especially for chronically ill population, although existing 
literatures are inconclusive regarding to this issue.   
There are several limitations in this dissertation.  The major limitation of this study is the 
study population.  Since the sample was drawn from an insured working-age population, the 
findings are not necessarily generalizable to other populations such as the poor or the elderly or 
the uninsured.  Another limitation is that it does not include detail information on types of drug 
benefit design, which could affect the size of the estimates.  Last but not least, this dissertation 
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does not address the health effect of a cost shifting from employers to employees, although other 
studies have demonstrated adverse outcomes associated with a change in cost sharing (Tamblyn 
et al. 2001). 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
This study is an attempt to measure the effect of changes in drug benefit design on health 
care spending in a population diagnosed with diabetes in the United States. This is an important 
area of research for both economics reasons and health outcomes for the nation, especially with 
the projected number of Americans expecting to have diabetes or pre-diabetes in the next decade.  
In this analysis, disease specific health care costs are calculated as the marginal price resulting 
from changes in drug benefit design.  Within its own limitations, this study makes important 
contributions to this field of knowledge. The findings indicated that changes in drug benefits 
have shifted a larger financial burden of pharmacy costs onto patients.  The conclusions from this 
study are drawn only from the information of a specific segment of the general population. 
Diabetes is a major condition affecting all ages, income levels, races/ethnic groups, males or 
females, and geographical locations.   In other words, it is indiscriminate in its effect, thus, it has 
been given a high focus in care and management.  
Over the years, insurer and employers have explored different aspect of insurance to 
induce people to behavior in a certain manner or consume certain amount or type of care.  As 
shown by the findings from the RAND study, when people have to pay for more of their care out 
of their own pockets, they use fewer medical services and that type of services matters.  For 
instance, demand for inpatient and outpatient care was the least elastic, whereas use of dental and 
mental health services was most responsive to changes in copayment.  More studies are 
indicating that demand for prescription drugs is elastic as well.  Beneficiaries have responded by 
reducing their use of drugs, but their responses varies substantially among the top-selling 
therapeutic classes.   
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These findings raise concern that copayment increases could lead to adverse health 
consequences because of the large price effects, at least for individuals with chronic conditions 
such as diabetes.  A significant decrease in health care expenditure in diabetes care may or may 
not be worth it for the increased risk of patients foregoing drug therapy, hence, intensifying the 
conditions to the point of increased use of inpatient services, which could be more costly down 
the road for all parties involved.  These results definitely make benefit design an important 
public health tool for improving the health of the population.  However, to use this tool 
effectively, public and private plans must educate patients appropriately to become more 
sensitive to the cost of treatment without encouraging them to forego cost-effective care. 
7.1 Direction for Future Research  
Although cost sharing was originally intended to curb insurance-related overuse, a “one-
size fits all” approach could exacerbate the health outcomes of many patients, particularly those 
who are chronically ill and depend on regular regimen of prescription drugs.  Many employers 
and insurers are turning to prescription drug cost sharing as an effective means to control 
prescription drug costs among employer-based and publicly funded health plans.  However, there 
is growing evidence from existing literature on the unintended effects on the process and 
outcomes of therapy resulting from cost sharing or cost shifting. Further research is warranted to 
understand the full effects on costs of increased drug copayments by examining medical 
spending as well as describing more completely the potential impacts on health, particularly in 
the chronically ill population, i.e. diabetes.  These unintended consequences call to question the 
equity and fairness of such strategy—cost sharing or cost shifting. Therefore, the key question 
that employers, insurers, health policy makers and patients must address is whether the current 
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cost sharing practice is the optimal strategy to cut healthcare cost, or it needs to be modified to 
balance between reducing healthcare cost and the unintended consequences. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Table 2.1 Classes and Actions of Medications 
Source:  Diabetesnet.com Diabetes Medications.  Available from 
http://www.diabetesnet.com/about-diabetes/diabetes-medications 
 
 
Class Generic Name Brand 
Name 
Comments How 
Sulfonylureas Chlorpropamide Diabinese Use with caution in the 
elderly. May cause lows 
With meal 
first-generation 
Tolazamide Tolinase May cause lows With meal 
first-generation 
Glyburide Micronase Take 1 to 2 times a day. With meal 
second- Diabeta May cause lows 
generation Glynase 
Pres Tab 
  
Glipizide Glucotrol Take 2 times a day or 
once with (XL).May 
cause lows 
30 
minutes 
before a 
meal second- Glucotrol XL 
generation   
Glimepiride Amaryl Take 1 time a day. May 
cause lows 
With meal 
third-generation 
Biguanides Metformin Glucophage Not used with congestive 
heart, renal or liver 
problems. Check 
creatinine clearance if 
over 65 years of age. 
With meal 
Alpha-Glucosidase Acarbose Precose May have side effects in 
the gastrointestinal 
With first 
bite of 
food 
Miglitol Glyset tract. 
Thiazolidinediones Rosiglitazone Avandia May reduce effectiveness 
of birth control pills. 
Take at 
same time 
each day Pioglitazone Actos Check liver enzymes as 
directed. 
Meglitinides Repaglinide Prandin Take with each meal. 
May cause lows 
Before 
meals 
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Table 3.4 Elixhauser Comorbidity Measures 
 
    Definitions of Comorbidities   ICD9 CM Diagnosis Codes    V28 DRGs  
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    Definitions of Comorbidities   ICD9 CM Diagnosis Codes    V28 DRGs 
 
The original table appeared in the paper by Elixhauser et al (1998). This table has been updated 
to reflect the ICD-9-CM and DRG/MS-DRG updates in the software. 
 
Source: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP).   
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/comorbidity/comorbidity.jsp  
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Table 3.6 Annual total Expenditures on Pharmaceutical, Outpatient Services and Inpatient 
Services, By Selected Characteristics of Patients with Diabetes 
 Intervention 
Group 
  Comparison 
Group 
 
 
N=2,447 
  
N=810  
Personal  
Characteristics 
Pre- 
Change 
Post-
Change 
Pre- 
Change 
Post- 
Change 
 
 
Expenditure (Mean (SD)) $ 
 
    
 
  Total Healthcare 4456.34 
(6345.07) 
4827.03 
(6451.19) 
4220.47 
(4011.81) 
6573.15 
(11039.91) 
 
 
  Total Rx  2937.34 
(2943.91) 
3234.34 
(3090.43) 
3187.62 
(3101.99) 
3694.41  
(3584.14) 
 
 
  Total Inpatient 655.34 
(4512.11) 
771.90 
(4740.55) 
172.38 
(91344.60) 
1559.45 
(9108.52) 
 
 
  Total Outpatient 864.78  
(2143.31) 
821.91 
(1683.41) 
860.47 
(1551.70) 
1319.29 
(2024.89) 
 
 
  Total Out-of-Pocket 201.80 
(241.11) 
227.05 
(243.57) 
106.51 
(139.96) 
114.97 
(139.97) 
 
 
    
 
Age (No. (%)) 
 
    
 
  18-34 
 
 
244  
(9.97) 
 
 115  
(14.20) 
 
 
 
  35-44 
 
 
495  
(20.23) 
 
 124  
(15.31) 
 
 
 
  45-54 
 
 
871  
(35.59) 
 
 392  
(4840) 
 
 
 
  55-62 
 
837  
(34.21) 
 179  
(22.10) 
 
 
 
    
 
Sex 
 
    
 
  Male 
 
 
1387  
(56.68) 
 
 477  
(58.89) 
 
 
 
  Female 
 
1060  
(43.32) 
 333  
(41.11) 
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Abbreviations: HMO, health maintenance organization; POS, point of service; PPO, preferred 
provider organization.   *The sample consists of 3257 patients with diabetes (based on 
pharmaceutical claims) enrolled in drug plans. Data are from the 2000 and 2001 Market Scan 
Research Database (MEDSTAT, Ann Arbor, MI). 
 
Plan Type 
 
  Comprehensive 
 
133  
(5.44) 
 
126  
(5.14) 
 
810 
(100.00) 
810  
(100.00) 
 
 
  HMO 
 
121  
(4.94) 
 
121  
(494) 
 
  
 
  PPO 
 
290  
(11.85) 
 
290  
(11.84) 
 
  
 
  POS 
 
515 
(21.05) 
 
515  
(21.02) 
 
  
 
  POS Capitated 
 
1388  
(56.72) 
1398 
(57.06) 
  
 
 
    
 
Comorbidity Score (Mean (SD)) 1.56  
(4.27) 
1.21  
(3.38) 
0.07  
(0.52) 
0.15  
(0.68) 
 
 
    
 
Region 
 
    
 
  Northeast  637  
(26.03) 
 
      1  
    (0.12) 
 
 
 
  North Central 639  
(26.11) 
 
     805  
    (99.38) 
 
 
 
  South 960  
(39.23) 
 
     3  
    (0.37) 
 
 
 
  West 211  
(8.62) 
 
     1  
    (0.12) 
 
 
 
    
 
Residence      
  Urban 2412  
(98.57) 
 
     786  
    (97.04) 
 
 
 
  Rural 35  
(1.43) 
      24  
    (2.96) 
 
 
 
    
 
Income (Mean(SD)) 30872.22 
(7507.22) 
     29223.99 
   (7950.03) 
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Table 5.1 This is the Full Regression Model:  
                Total Healthcare and Total Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Expenditure 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Log Total 
Healthcare 
Expenditure (DV)  
ME ($) Total 
Healthcare 
Expenditure  
Log Total OOP 
Expenditure (DV) 
ME ($) Total 
OOP Expenditure  
Plan  0.02 99.71 0.62*** 96.67*** 
 (0.07) (303.50) (0.06) (8.05) 
 
Year 0.43*** 2022.91*** 0.07 12.63 
 (0.05) (242.81) (0.04) (7.61) 
 
Plan*Year -0.34*** -1532.32*** 0.06 11.69 
 (0.05) (245.18) (0.05) (8.82) 
 
Female 0.13*** 627.00*** 0.04 7.36 
 (0.04) (184.88) (0.03) (6.10) 
 
Age (35-44) 0.36*** 1865.53*** -0.08 -13.84 
 (0.08) (466.57) (0.06) (10.30) 
 
Age (45-54) 0.35*** 1713.66*** -0.18** -31.06*** 
 (0.06) (307.51) (0.05) (9.35) 
 
Age (55-62) 0.49*** 2547.07*** -0.21*** -36.91*** 
 (0.06) (353.32) (0.05) (9.11) 
 
Income 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Urban 0.13 559.07 0.07 11.61 
 (0.09) (354.83) (0.16) (26.52) 
 
Comorbidity 0.04*** 177.75*** 0.03*** 4.93*** 
 (0.00) (19.81) (0.00) (0.75) 
 
North Central 0.04 200.57 0.09 16.62 
 (0.07) (324.93) (0.05) (9.00) 
 
South -0.12* -556.36* 0.03 4.85 
 (0.05) (243.43) (0.05) (8.33) 
 
West -0.00 -8.70 0.36*** 74.81*** 
 (0.09) (436.63) (0.08) (20.78) 
 
_cons 7.76***  4.45***  
 (0.15)  (0.19)  
N=3257     
Note: Dependent variable (DV); marginal effects (ME); Standard errors (SE) in parentheses; age category 
reference (18-34); region category reference (northeast).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.2 This is the Model for Individual Service Expenditure:  
                 Pharmaceutical Services and Inpatient Services 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Log 
Pharmaceutical 
Services (DV)  
ME ($) 
Pharmaceutical 
Services 
Log Inpatient 
Services (DV) 
ME ($) Inpatient 
Services 
Plan  -0.10 -311.24 1.41*** 545.24*** 
 (0.05) (175.64) (0.35) (117.69) 
 
Year 0.15*** 475.78*** 2.24*** 1396.56*** 
 (0.02) (56.61) (0.30) (270.54) 
 
Plan*Year -0.05* -160.46* -2.07*** -969.64*** 
 (0.02) (63.86) (0.34) (184.35) 
 
Female 0.12*** 374.47*** 0.18 93.02 
 (0.03) (102.32) (0.17) (86.71) 
 
Age (35-44) 0.47*** 1672.16*** 0.42 243.42 
 (0.06) (263.78) (0.30) (201.21) 
 
Age (45-54) 0.63*** 2135.61*** -0.01 -6.90 
 (0.05) (190.43) (0.25) (128.65) 
 
Age (55-62) 0.76*** 2773.08*** 0.46 259.31 
 (0.05) (226.29) (0.27) (167.73) 
 
Income -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
Urban -0.00 -3.89 1.13 352.00** 
 (0.09) (268.25) (0.64) (114.14) 
 
Comorbidity 0.01*** 22.15*** 0.21*** 107.74*** 
 (0.00) (6.37) (0.01) (9.79) 
 
North Central -0.02 -50.63 0.26 134.03 
 (0.06) (173.76) (0.28) (150.16) 
 
South -0.08 -238.29 -0.55* -251.71* 
 (0.04) (130.41) (0.25) (108.15) 
 
West -0.09 -252.79 0.26 151.16 
 (0.07) (191.66) (0.39) (252.54) 
 
_cons 7.48***  2.80***  
 (0.14)  (0.82)  
N=3257     
Note: Dependent variable (DV); marginal effects (ME); Standard errors (SE) in parentheses; age category 
reference (18-34); region category reference (northeast).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.3 This is the Model for Individual Service Expenditure:  
                 Outpatient Services 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Log Outpatient 
Services (DV)  
ME ($) Outpatient 
Services  
Plan  -0.00 -2.74 
 (0.10) (86.08) 
 
Year 0.43*** 373.69*** 
 (0.06) (57.39) 
 
Plan*Year -0.45*** -364.41*** 
 (0.08) (64.99) 
 
Female 0.09 74.88 
 (0.06) (52.11) 
 
Age (35-44) -0.07 -62.59 
 (0.09) (74.22) 
 
Age (45-54) -0.30** -249.77*** 
 (0.09) (72.41) 
 
Age (55-62) -0.30*** -243.92*** 
 (0.09) (68.91) 
 
Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Urban 0.08 63.66 
 (0.20) (158.46) 
 
Comorbidity 0.05*** 46.28*** 
 (0.01) (8.27) 
 
North Central 0.18 156.82 
 (0.09) (82.90) 
 
South 0.08 73.98 
 (0.10) (86.23) 
 
West -0.01 -10.31 
 (0.14) (114.57) 
 
_cons 6.73***  
 (0.26)  
N=3257     
Note: Dependent variable (DV); marginal effects (ME); Standard errors (SE) in parentheses; age category 
reference (18-34); region category reference (northeast).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.4 This is the Model for Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Expenditures:  
                 Pharmaceutical Services and Inpatient Services 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Log OOP 
Pharmaceutical 
Services (DV) 
ME ($) OOP 
Pharmaceutical 
Services 
Log OOP 
Inpatient Services 
(DV) 
ME ($) OOP 
Inpatient Services 
Plan  1.36*** 79.36*** 1.95*** 11.23*** 
 (0.04) (2.07) (0.27) (1.99) 
 
Year 0.05* 3.47* 0.18 1.45 
 (0.02) (1.46) (0.17) (1.38) 
 
Plan*Year 0.20*** 15.64*** 0.23 1.89 
 (0.02) (1.84) (0.28) (2.33) 
 
Female -0.06** -4.67** 0.05 0.42 
 (0.02) (1.78) (0.19) (1.57) 
 
Age (35-44) -0.07 -5.40 0.01 0.04 
 (0.04) (3.20) (0.38) (3.05) 
 
Age (45-54) -0.09* -7.00* 0.13 1.07 
 (0.04) (2.90) (0.35) (2.88) 
 
Age (55-62) -0.19*** -14.19*** 0.23 1.98 
 (0.04) (2.82) (0.36) (3.18) 
 
Income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Urban 0.18* 12.67* -0.04 -0.32 
 (0.08) (5.25) (0.56) (4.68) 
 
Comorbidity -0.00 -0.15 0.24*** 1.90*** 
 (0.00) (0.21) (0.01) (0.19) 
 
North Central 0.04 3.39 0.30 2.44 
 (0.04) (2.83) (0.34) (2.92) 
 
South 0.07* 5.78* 0.41 3.64 
 (0.03) (2.60) (0.34) (3.30) 
 
West 0.14** 10.98** 1.76*** 34.52* 
 (0.05) (4.18) (0.44) (17.52) 
 
_cons 2.97***  -1.09  
 (0.10)  (0.88)  
N=3257     
Note: Dependent variable (DV); marginal effects (ME); Standard errors (SE) in parentheses; age category 
reference (18-34); region category reference (northeast).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
70 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 This is the Model for Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Expenditures:  
                 Outpatient Services 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Log OOP 
Outpatient Services 
(DV) 
ME ($) OOP 
Outpatient Services 
Plan  0.10 8.15 
 (0.09) (6.70) 
 
Year 0.08 6.33 
 (0.05) (4.46) 
 
Plan*Year -0.14* -11.48* 
 (0.06) (5.07) 
 
Female 0.12* 9.77* 
 (0.05) (4.06) 
 
Age (35-44) -0.10 -7.83 
 (0.10) (7.38) 
 
Age (45-54) -0.26** -21.03** 
 (0.08) (6.55) 
 
Age (55-62) -0.28** -21.65*** 
 (0.09) (6.41) 
 
Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Urban 0.03 2.40 
 (0.20) (15.60) 
 
Comorbidity 0.04*** 3.17*** 
 (0.00) (0.35) 
 
North Central 0.09 7.54 
 (0.08) (6.62) 
 
South -0.10 -8.38 
 (0.07) (5.63) 
 
West 0.17 15.47 
 (0.11) (10.48) 
 
_cons 4.44***  
 (0.24)  
N=3257     
Note: Dependent variable (DV); marginal effects (ME); Standard errors (SE) in parentheses; age category 
reference (18-34); region category reference (northeast).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.6 Variable Summary 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Response Variable 
   Total Healthcare Expenditure 
Sum of employer and patient’s payment for 
drug, inpatient and outpatient services 
   Total Out-of-pocket Expenditure 
Sum of patient’s copay and deductible for 
drug, inpatient and outpatient services 
   Pharmaceutical Service Expenditure 
 
Sum of employer & patient’s payment for 
pharmaceutical services 
   Inpatient Service Expenditure 
 
Sum of employer & patient’s payment for 
inpatient services 
   Outpatient Service Expenditure 
Sum of employer & patient’s payment for 
outpatient services 
   Out-of-pocket Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
Patient’s copay and deductible for 
pharmaceutical services 
   Out-of-pocket Inpatient Expenditure 
Patient’s copay and deductible for inpatient 
services 
   Out-of-pocket Outpatient Expenditure 
Patient’s copay and deductible for outpatient 
services 
Explanatory Variables 
   Plan 
Indicator for change in drug benefit plan  
(1=intervention group; 0=comparison group) 
  Gender Male* = 0     Female = 1    
   Age0* 18-34 
   Age1 35-44 
   Age2 45-55 
   Age3 55-64 
   Income Indicator for income (continuous variable)             
72 
 
 
 
   Urban Rural* = 0   Urban = 1   
   Region0* Northeast Region             
   Region1 North Central Region 
   Region2 South Region 
   Region3 West Region 
   Comorbidity Score 
Elixhauser comorbidity score used in the 
regression model to control for comorbid 
effect  
 
* indicates that it was used as the reference group in the regression model. 
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With spending for prescription drugs rising so rapidly, employers and insurers are 
seeking different cost-cutting strategies to stem this tide.  Given that prescription drugs have 
become an indispensable means to treat and manage chronic illnesses, the issues of affordability 
and trade-offs between medications and other health care services are important for chronically 
ill patients, particularly for patients with diabetes who typically have more than one comorbidity 
that require drug therapy, and their health insurance plans.   In this dissertation, I analyze the 
effect of prescription drug cost-shifting via changes in drug benefit design on healthcare 
expenditure among individuals with diabetes; I take into account the comorbid effect of diabetes 
for the age population ranging from 18 to 62.    
Study design, data and organization of the report:  
 This study uses a retrospective research design with observational historical data from the 
MarketScan Research Database from 2000 to 2001.  The subjects are individuals enrolled in 
large employer-sponsored health insurance plans aged 18 to 62 who were diagnosed with 
diabetes from 2000 to 2001.  The analysis of this study relies on the assumption that changes in 
spending are caused by changes in the drug benefit plan resulting from the action of employers 
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as they seek different ways to cut cost.  Regression using GEE estimation technique was used for 
the analysis. 
Major findings and conclusions: 
The overall effect on total healthcare expenditure was a decrease of $1,532.32 on average 
in the intervention group relative to the comparison group.  The average follow-up year 
incremental out-of-pocket spending for drug following the changes in drug benefit design for an 
individual in the intervention group was $15.64.  Changes in benefit plan design continue to be a 
significant predictor for drug spending only.  Specifically, relative to the comparison group’s 
drug spending, the intervention group is more likely to decrease spending on average by $160.45 
for drug services.  To a certain extent, geographic region appears to be a significant predictor for 
inpatient (i.e. south) but not for drug spending and outpatient services spending.  The 
comorbidity score is a significant predictor for increased spending in all three services and total 
healthcare expenditure and total out-of-pocket expenditure below 1% level.  In the models for 
out-of-pocket expenditure for each service, the plan change conditional on time has a significant 
effect on only drug and outpatient services out-of-pocket spending, not on inpatient services.  
The findings suggest that the decrease in total health care expenditure borne mostly by 
the employers and insurers is explained by changes in drug benefit plan design during the study 
period from 2000 to 2001.  Thus, higher levels of cost sharing transfer a large financial burden to 
the patient.  All things considered, if all changes in healthcare spending are broadly defined as 
changes in drug benefit design imposed by the employers, then such changes are effective in 
managing the demand side of healthcare cost even in a chronically ill population who depends on 
regular drug therapy. 
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